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2007 JAMES McCORMICK MITCHELL LECTURE
Quo Vadis, Habeas Corpus?'
JAMES ROBERTSONt
The poster that advertised this lecture emphasized two
decisions of mine that brought down upon me my allotted
fifteen minutes of fame, but Professor Steinfeld2 was quite
discreet when he extended the University's invitation last
March: he did not ask me to discuss either my opinion in
the Guantdnamo Bay case3 or my resignation from the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance (FISA) Court.4 What he
did, instead, was advise me that the very first Mitchell
Lecture, given here 56 years ago by Justice Robert H.
Jackson, was entitled Wartime Security and Liberty Under
1. The 2007 James McCormick Mitchell Lecture, University at Buffalo Law
School, March 21, 2007.
t United States District Judge for the District of Columbia. The helpful
comments of Judge Louis F. Oberdorfer and the invaluable assistance of Emily
Coward, Jonathan Olin, and Joel Meyer are gratefully acknowledged.
2. Robert J. Steinfeld, Robert and Karen Jones Faculty Scholar and
Professor and Chair, Mitchell Lecture Committee, University at Buffalo Law
School, The State University of New York.
3. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152 (D.D.C. 2004).
4. See, e.g., Carol D. Leonnig & Dafna Linzer, Spy Court Judge Quits in
Protest, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2005, at Al.
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Law,5 and suggest that I might wish to speak on a similar
subject. I have never said anything to anybody about my
resignation from the FISA court, however, at least not
publicly, and I don't plan to start now. And it would be
improper for me to discuss or comment upon the Hamdan
case, which is still pending, or, should I say, pending again.
And so what I told Professor Steinfeld was that I would talk
more abstractly: about that three-vector force diagram of
our government that we call checks and balances-about
the ambitions of presidents to power, the fecklessness of the
legislature, and the limitations upon the judiciary to do
anything much about the other two branches. What
happened, in other words, to checks and balances? Then, a
few months later, last July, the Supreme Court declared in
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 6 that the President had indeed
overstepped his powers at Guantdnamo, and it challenged
Congress to wake up and act. That decision, and what it
brought about, gave us all a civics lesson in checks and
balances-not the one we had hoped for, perhaps, but a
lesson nevertheless, and a lesson as well in the law of
unintended consequences. Congress not only authorized the
Executive to conduct trials by military commission at
Guant~namo Bay, but, en passant,7 it also stripped the
federal courts of their statutory jurisdiction to hear habeas
corpus petitions or any other actions filed by aliens who are
detained as enemy combatants or who are even awaiting a
determination of whether or not they are enemy
combatants.8 So much for what I had thought was the
fecklessness of the legislature!
One of the consequences of this intense little piece of
American legal history has been to reveal how little
understood is the writ of habeas corpus, even by Congress
(or, perhaps, especially by Congress); and, despite the lofty
language of Blackstone and the rhetorical flourishes of
Supreme Court opinions about habeas corpus, how much
5. Robert H. Jackson, Wartime Security and Liberty Under Law, 1 BUFF. L.
REV. 103 (1951).
6. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
7. This chess metaphor is apt, if one considers district judges to be pawns
who forgot their place.
8. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7(a), 120 Stat.
2600, 2635-36. Section 7(a) is the jurisdiction-stripping provision.
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the writ is at risk of becoming a rather impotent legal
anachronism. The Great Writ of habeas corpus, "esteemed"
by the Supreme Court as "the best and only sufficient
defence of personal [liberty],"9 and considered by Blackstone
to be a "second magna carta,"'10 has been reduced in our own
time to a procedural quagmire for jailhouse lawyers, and it
has been treated by the judiciary, I fear, as something of a
nuisance.
The history of the writ that came to our shores with
English settlers is interesting for its own sake, but you may
be startled by its parallels with what is happening today.
As I outline that history-and I can only outline it-I will
try to demonstrate that, for three hundred years, habeas
corpus has been a reliable barometer for observing changes
in the atmosphere of liberty, and also, if you will forgive the
mixed metaphor, a voltmeter (or maybe I mean an
ammeter)-a device, in any event, for measuring the
distribution of power between and among the three
branches of our national government. 1 I will also have a
few words about the future of habeas-not predictions, but
suggestions, or, perhaps, wishes.
I. ENGLISH ORIGINS OF HABEAS CORPUS
Some commentators seem to believe, without having
consulted either Google or Wikipedia, that the writ of
habeas corpus was mentioned in, and dates to, Magna
Carta. It was not, and it does not. Magna Carta, as we all
know, was a document King John's barons more or less
forced him to sign in a meadow at Runnymede in the year
1215. Known today as the Charter of Freedom, it contained
many concessions by the King, promising, among other
things, that
[n]o free man shall be seized or imprisoned, or stripped of his
rights or possessions, or outlawed or exiled, or deprived of his
standing in any other way, nor will we [the royal we] proceed with
force against him, or send others to do so, except by the lawful
9. Exparte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 95 (1868).
10. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *138.
11. Now seems to be an especially appropriate time to consult this
barometer. See generally FREDERICK A.O. SCHWARZ JR. & Aziz Z. HuQ,
UNCHECKED AND UNBALANCED: PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN A TIME OF TERROR (2007).
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judgment of his equals or by the law of the land.12
The King signed with his fingers crossed behind his
back, having no intention of keeping that promise or any of
the other fifty or sixty set forth in the document, but Magna
Carta outlived him and was the seed from which grew both
parliamentary government and the Rule of Law. As the
great English historian Trevelyan wrote, Magna Carta's
"historical importance lay not only in what the men of 1215
intended by its clauses, but in the effect which it has had on
the imagination of their descendants." 13 No, habeas corpus
was not present at Runnymede. It is fair to say, however,
that, nearly four hundred years later, habeas corpus gave
effect to Magna Carta.
Other commentators seem to think, without having
consulted their Latin dictionaries, that the words "habeas
corpus" mean "produce the body."'14 The literal words do not.
They mean, "you have the body."15 They were the
introductory words of a writ, or formal document, usually
under seal, addressed by a judge to a jailer or to someone
having custody of a prisoner. Perhaps Professor Bozer or
Professor Baumgarten 16 has the full text of an actual writ of
habeas corpus from medieval times-I have never been able
to find one-but the gist of it was something like this: 'You
have the body of William. Bring him to me, in three days
time, and show me what legal cause you have for detaining
him." That at least, was the writ as it had evolved by the
late sixteenth century. And evolution is the right concept,
12. British Library Treasures in Full: Magna Carta - English Translation,
http://www.bl.uk/treasures/magnacarta/translation.html (last visited Sept. 28,
2007).
13. GEORGE MACAULAY TREVELYAN, HISTORY OF ENGLAND 172 (1926).
14. See, e.g., Public Citizen, Get the FAQs on Habeas Corpus: Frequently
Asked Questions, http://action.citizen.org/content.jsp?contentKEY=2358 (last
visited Sept. 24, 2007) ("Habeas Corpus means 'produce the body."').
15. This worked better in a lecture hall than it does in a scholarly journal.
My own Latin dictionary was actually no help. I relied upon my schoolboy
Latin, and I now freely acknowledge that, in some long-forgotten declension of
the verb (habeo, habere), "habeas" may be a command, as in "have him here."
16. Alan J. Bozer is an adjunct lecturer, and Mary C. Baumgarten an
adjunct instructor, at the University at Buffalo Law School, The State
University of New York. They teach L-812 "The Great Writs and Post-
Conviction Remedies."
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not intelligent design: habeas corpus had existed for a
couple of hundred years, but as a lower order of writ-a
piece of paper compelling someone to move a prisoner from
one place to another. 17 It was not until the reign of
Elizabeth I that habeas corpus began to be recognizable as
what one scholar has called "a palladium against arbitrary
government,"' 8 and it was another hundred years before it
became the Great Writ.
In 1587, Frances Walsingham, a member of Elizabeth's
Privy Council, ordered the detention of a man named
Hellyard. Treason was afoot-it was Walsingham who, in
the same year, perhaps even as part of the same
investigation, discovered a plot to kill Elizabeth and
learned that Mary Queen of Scots was "acquainted" with
it 19 -which was why Mary lost her head. (It is tempting to
name modern-day avatars for Walsingham and for a
number of other characters in this story, but I will resist
the temptation.) Application was made on Hellyard's behalf
for a writ of habeas corpus. The question was not whether
the writ would issue-that was virtually automatic, and
immediate-in those times a judge presented with an
affidavit was required to act immediately2 O-but issuance of
the writ only started the process. The question was, what
cause Walsingham would give for Hellyard's detention
when he made his return. Walsingham's return said,
essentially, "I, Walsingham, am the principal military
secretary of Her Majesty's household, and the prisoner was
committed at my order." That pomposity was held, by some
17. See Alan Clarke, Habeas Corpus: The Historical Debate, 14 N.Y.L. SCH.
J. HuM. RTS. 375, 378 (1998) (noting that the purpose of the original writ of
habeas corpus was 'firmly established by 1230' as a procedural writ to bring
people ... before the court").
18. WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 40
(1980) ("The fiction that the writ of habeas corpus provided the English subject
with a palladium against arbitrary government pressed closer to reality when
the courts of common law began to resist what they perceived as interference
from the Privy Council.").
19. See TREVELYAN, supra note 13, at 352.
20. See Allen E. Shoenberger, The Not So Great Writ: The European Court of
Human Rights Finds Habeas Corpus an Inadequate Remedy: Should American
Courts Reexamine the Writ?, 56 CATHOLIC U. L. REV. 47, 54 (2006) ("Indeed, the
court itself, including the lord chancellor, lord keeper, any judge, or baron, was
potentially liable to the prisoner for five hundred pounds for denial of a required
writ of habeas corpus.").
2008] 1067
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
long forgotten but courageous judge, to be an insufficient
reason; Hellyard was ordered released.
21
I call the judge in Hellyard's Case22 courageous because,
in his time, there was really only one branch of government
that counted. Judges served at the pleasure of the Crown,
and "feckless" did not begin to describe the timidity of
Parliament. Forty years later, though, after Elizabeth was
gone, and her successor James I was gone, and young King
Charles I was on the throne, it was a different story. Almost
as soon as Charles was crowned, he involved England in a
series of "warlike expeditions" against the France of
Cardinal Richelieu and against Spain.23 "The wars, such as
they were," wrote Trevelyan, became a "tale of folly and
disaster," and "lowered the prestige of [the] monarchy in
England, and brought the Crown into fierce conflict with
the House of Commons. ' 24 By 1628, less than three years
after his coronation, Charles had accumulated a stack of
grievances in Parliament. He had forced merchants and
even noblemen to loan money to the Crown, he had
quartered troops among the populace, he had authorized
arbitrary arrests, he had people thrown in prison in
violation of Magna Carta. Parliament had had enough. It
prepared and delivered to Charles a document that came to
be known as The Petition of Right. 25 The Petition of Right
asked that no one be imprisoned without a showing of
cause, that habeas corpus be available in all cases to
examine the cause, and, if a writ were returned without
cause, that the prisoner be released-even if he had been
committed by order of the King himself or by the entire
Privy Council.
The King agreed to The Petition of Right in Parliament,
but he almost immediately disavowed it. His attorney
general said that the petition was not law, and that it was
21. See DUKER, supra note 18, at 41 (citing Hellyard's Case, (1587) 74 Eng.
Rep. 455 (C.P.)).
22. (1587) 74 Eng. Rep. 455 (C.P.).
23. TREVELYAN, supra note 13, at 389.
24. Id.
25. THE PETITION OF RIGHT (Eng. 1628), available at
http://www.constitution.org/eng/petright.htm. Its language is flowery and
obsequious, but, if you read it, you will have a better understanding of the
provenance of the Declaration of Independence.
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"the duty of the people not to stretch it beyond the words
and intention of the king. ' 26 Call that, perhaps, the first
signing statement.27 And Charles was as bad as his word. A
judge released a man on a writ of habeas corpus when it
appeared that the man's only crime was insolent behavior
before the Privy Council, so the man was recharged in the
Court of Star Chamber 2 8-the dreaded high court that
operated in secret, without indictments, juries, or even
witnesses, and without appeals. The Star Chamber was
indeed a court, so the judges could do nothing about the
new charge, and Parliament had nothing to say about it,
because the King had taken Parliament completely out of
the picture by the simple expedient of dissolving it.29 In
other words, there were no checks and balances.
Charles ruled for the next eleven years without
Parliament and with a submissive judiciary, but of course
he became increasingly unpopular. Eventually, he ran out
of money and was forced to call Parliament into session. As
soon as it assembled, Parliament asserted itself-by
enacting the Habeas Corpus Act of 1640.30 That statute
essentially codified The Petition of Right, which Charles
had ignored, and it abolished the Court of Star Chamber. It
was the tipping point in a long confrontation between King
and Parliament that culminated in the English Civil War,
the rise of Oliver Cromwell, and the removal of King
Charles. (He was not merely removed-he was beheaded.)
Cromwell the executive was no more supportive of
habeas corpus than Charles the monarch had been. He, too,
dissolved Parliament. Parliament was restored after
Cromwell died, and the monarchy was restored, and
Charles II became king, but this Charles, too, had his
problems. The Great Plague of 1665 and the Great Fire of
26. Proceedings against William Stroud, (1629) 3 State Trials 235, 281
(K.B.).
27. Cf. Charlie Savage, Bush Challenges Hundreds of Laws, BOSTON GLOBE,
Apr. 30, 2006, available at http://www.boston.com/news/nation/
articles/2006/04/30/bush-challengeshundreds of laws/.
28. See DUKER, supra note 18, at 46-47 (citing Chamber's Case, (1679) 79
Eng. Rep. 717 (K.B.) (Privy Council); Chamber's Case, (1630) 79 Eng. Rep. 746
(K.B.) (Star Chamber)).
29. See TREVELYAN, supra note 13, at 390.
30. 16 Car., c.10 (Eng.).
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London in 1666 happened on his watch-they were the
seventeenth century's version of Hurricane Katrina.
Charles II made war on the Dutch and had his "mission-
accomplished" moment when the English captured New
Amsterdam, 31 but that was followed by serious setbacks, for
which he made a scapegoat of his closest personal advisor,
Edward Hyde, Lord Clarendon, Lord Chancellor of
England. Not only did Clarendon give poor advice about the
war-he was also impeached in the House of Commons, for
sending "divers of his majesty's subjects to be imprisoned
against [the] law, in [the] remote islands, garrisons, and
other places, thereby to prevent them from the benefit of
the law, and to produce precedents for the imprisoning any
other of his majesty's subjects in like manner."32
Interestingly enough, the people he sent to be imprisoned in
the remote islands were primarily the religious
fundamentalists of their times: the defeated Puritans, the
regicides, thought to be "at large, plotting out there. '33
Charles II was also at odds with Parliament. He
dissolved it four times. The 1679 Parliament, however,
managed to enact the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, described
as "probably the most famous statute in the annals of
English Law. ' 34 "Habeas Corpus Act" is not the name
Parliament gave to the statute. The official name was "An
Act for the better secureing the Liberty of the Subject and
for Prevention of Imprisonments beyond the Seas. '35 This
Act not only established once and for all the right of a
subject to petition for habeas corpus, but it also laid out the
procedure: it commanded that a return be made and the
prisoner produced within three days (ten days, if the
prisoner had to be transported more than twenty miles;
31. New Amsterdam was later renamed in honor of Charles's brother, the
Duke of York. See, e.g., DAVID M. ELLIS ET AL., A SHORT HISTORY OF NEW YORK
STATE 28 (1957).
32. DUKER, supra note 18, at 53 (citing Proceedings in Parliament against
Edward Earl of Clarendon, (1663-1667) 6 State Trials 291, 330).
33. This American Life: Habeas Schmabeas (Chicago Public Radio broadcast
Mar. 10, 2006), available at http://www.thislife.org/RadioEpisode.aspx?episode=310.
34. See DUKER, supra note 18, at 52.
35. (1679) 31 Car. 2, c.2 (Eng.), available at http://www.british-history.
ac.uk/report.asp?compid=47484.
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twenty, if more than 100 miles); 36 a return was to "certify
the true causes of [the person's] detainer and
imprisonment"; and, unless it appeared from the return
that the prisoner was "detained upon a legal process, order
or warrant, out of some court that hath jurisdiction of
criminal matters," the prisoner was to be discharged-that
is, set free.
II. HABEAS CORPUS AT THE FOUNDING
That was the Great Writ. That was the fully evolved
writ of habeas corpus, as it was imported, sometimes
wholesale, sometimes piecemeal, into the laws of all
thirteen American colonies.37  Every member of the
Constitutional Convention that convened in Philadelphia
110 years after the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679 knew about
it.3s English history was their history, after all, so they
knew that the Great Writ had been forged on the anvil of
struggle between King and Parliament over nearly a
century.
They also knew that the writ could be, and had been,
suspended. Indeed, it was only months after James II was
forced into exile by the so-called Glorious Revolution of
1688, and William and Mary had been crowned upon their
acceptance of an English Bill of Rights, and a century of
turmoil over religion and arbitrary monarchical power had
finally come to a peaceful end, that the new king suggested
that habeas be suspended for three months-because
"several persons about the Town, in Cabals [were
conspiring] against the Government, for the interest of King
James," because some of these people had been
''apprehended and secured," because others might also be
apprehended and secured, and because "[i]f these should be
set at liberty, 'tis apprehended we shall be wanting to our
36. Cognoscenti will know that the three-day period for returning the writ
has been preserved intact in the federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2243
(1971), with an allowance of up to twenty days for good cause.
37. See DUKER, supra note 18, at 95-125.
38. See generally Max Rosenn, The Great Writ-A Reflection of Societal
Change, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 337, 337-38 (1983) (describing a published account of
English jurors securing their freedom through habeas corpus that received
"noteworthy attention in the American colonies").
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own safety, the Government, and People. ' 39 Parliament
agreed to one suspension, for three months, but not to
another, perhaps accepting the argument of Sir Robert
Napier, who said "This Mistress of ours, the Habeas Corpus
Act, if we part with it twice, it will become quite a common
Whore. Let us not remove this Landmark of the Nation, for
a curse attends it."40
The Founders also knew that the writ of habeas corpus
had uses that transcended criminal law and extended to
questions of public policy and even morality, as in the
celebrated case of James Sommersett, who was a slave.
41
An Englishman named Stewart purchased Sommersett in
Virginia and brought him to England. Sommersett escaped,
but he did not get away. He was seized by Stewart's agents
and chained up in a ship bound for Jamaica, where
Stewart, who had no use for an escape-minded slave, was
going to sell him. Three English citizens submitted
affidavits in support of a petition to Lord Mansfield for a
writ of habeas corpus. The captain of the slave ship
responded that this was a property matter-that
Sommersett had not been manumitted, enfranchised, set
free, or discharged. I refer you to Judge Higginbotham's
brilliant exegesis of this case42 and note here only the
peroration of Lord Mansfield's judgment:
The state of slavery is of such a nature, that it is incapable of
being introduced on any reasons, moral or political, but only by
positive law which preserves its force long after the reason,
occasion, and time itself when it was created, is erased from
memory. It is so odious that nothing can be suffered to support it,
but positive law. Whatever inconveniences, therefore, may follow
from the decision, I cannot say that this case is allowed or
approved by the law of England; and therefore the black must be
discharged.
43
39. DUKER, supra note 18, at 61 (quoting 9 DEBATES OF THE HOUSE OF
COMMONS 129-30 (Anchitell Grey ed., 1763)) (emphasis omitted).
40. DUKER, supra note 18, at 61 (quoting 9 DEBATES OF THE HOUSE OF
COMMONS 263 (Anchitell Grey ed., 1763)).
41. The Case of James Sommersett, (1772) 20 State Trials 1, 79-82 (K.B.);
see A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE AND THE
AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS, THE COLONIAL PERIOD 353 (1978).
42. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 41, at 353.
43. The Case of James Sommersett, (1772) 20 State Trials 1, 82 (K.B.).
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Understanding the history of habeas corpus, which by
then was universally understood to be a privilege of the
King's subjects and defined by common law, the Founders
included this clause in Article I, Section 9 of the
Constitution:
The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the
public Safety may require it.
44
Habeas corpus was the only common law writ
mentioned in the Constitution. It was also one of the first
subjects to which the first Congress turned its attention, in
the Judiciary Act of 1789, empowering federal courts, for
the purpose of inquiring into the cause of commitment, to"issue writs of ... habeas corpus, and all other writs not
specially provided for by statute, which may be necessary
for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and
agreeable to the principles and usages of law."45
III. JEFFERSON AND LINCOLN
There have been many notable developments in the
writ of habeas corpus in this country since 1789. The
nuance and filigree added by countless court decisions and
law review articles is by now far beyond the ability of any
ordinary person to absorb. I have time, and you will have
patience, only for two historical events that show clearly
how the Great Writ and the liberty interests that it
represents are supported by balanced power in government
and challenged when power is unbalanced and unchecked.
In 1805, Aaron Burr had completed his term as vice
president in Jefferson's first term. He had killed Alexander
Hamilton in a duel, he was deeply in debt, he had failed to
be elected governor of New York, and he had no law
practice left-so he set off on an excellent adventure
involving lands in the Ohio River Valley and the Louisiana
Purchase. 46 In late 1806 Jefferson became convinced that
44. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
45. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81.




these adventures were in fact a treasonous conspiracy, and
that Burr planned to seize New Orleans, attack Mexico,
assume Montezuma's throne, add Louisiana to his empire,
and then add the North American states from the
Allegheny Mountains west. Jefferson sent a special
message to Congress naming Burr as the "arch conspirator"
and asserting that his "guilt [was] placed beyond
question."47 Jefferson also asserted that Erick Bollman and
Samuel Swartwout were Burr's accomplices. 48 On orders
from the president, General James Wilkinson, acting
governor of the New Orleans territory, seized Bollman and
Swartwout and sent them to Washington for trial. The
Supreme Court of the territory issued a writ of habeas
corpus. Wilkinson ignored it. Another habeas was issued by
the district court in South Carolina when Bollman and
Swartwout were landed at Charleston, but that one, too,
was ignored. The day the two prisoners arrived in
Washington, Jefferson hand-carried information about
them to the U.S. Attorney and instructed the prosecutor to
go to court immediately and seek a bench warrant charging
them with treason. 49 That same afternoon, activated by
Jefferson's agents, the Senate passed a bill suspending
habeas corpus for three months. 50 George Washington had
assured Jefferson that Senators, with their six-year terms
of office, would be the saucer that could cool the hot tea of
democracy, 51 but this time it was the House that controlled
the situation, rejecting the habeas suspension bill by a vote
of 113 to 19.52 Shortly thereafter, Chief Justice Marshall
issued an order for the release of Bollman and Swartwout
with an opinion, one of first impression, that established
the Supreme Court's power to grant relief on a writ of
habeas corpus as an original action. 53 Ex parte Bollman has
47. Id. at 353.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 354-55.
50. Id. at 355. Note the attention to precedent: it was for three months that
Parliament suspended the writ at the suggestion of William and Mary in 1689.
51. See NewsHour with Jim Lehrer (PBS television broadcast Nov. 7, 2000)
(transcript available at http://www.pbs.org/newshourbb/politics/july-decOO/hist_11-
7.html).
52. SMITH, supra note 46, at 355.
53. Exparte Bollman, 8 U.S. 75 (1807).
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since been understood to hold that the Constitution not only
constrains the suspension of habeas corpus, but also
guarantees its continuing existence. 5
4
The next major habeas event came sixty years later, at
the start of the Civil War. I expect that almost everyone in
this room is generally aware that Abraham Lincoln
suspended habeas corpus. My guess is that many if not
most of you also believe that it was really okay-that
Lincoln could do no wrong, that he explained himself to
Congress, that his acts were ratified, that history presents
imperatives, et cetera, et cetera. But the more one knows
about this story, the more uncomfortable one becomes with
it-at least if one is a judge. Within weeks after his
inauguration in March 1861, and within days after the
surrender of Ft. Sumter, Lincoln became concerned that
troops coming to the defense of Washington from the North
might be interdicted by the destruction of railroad bridges
between Philadelphia and Washington, and particularly in
the vicinity of Baltimore. 55 On April 27, 1861, he gave an
order to General Winfield Scott, the Commanding General
of the Army of the United States. He wrote:
If at any point on or in the vicinity of the military line, which is
now [or which shall be] used between the City of Philadelphia and
the City of Washington . . . you find resistance which renders it
necessary to suspend the writ of Habeas Corpus for the public.
safety, you, personally or through the officer in command at the
point where resistance occurs, are authorized to suspend that
writ.
56
A month later, John Merryman was arrested-by military
troops, not by civilian law enforcement authorities-and
charged with participation in the destruction of railroad
bridges after the Baltimore riots in April. His lawyers
54. Justice Scalia, dissenting in INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 337 (2001),
does not agree: "A straightforward reading of this text discloses that [the
habeas clause of the Constitution] does not guarantee any content to (or even
the existence of) the writ of habeas corpus, but merely provides that the writ
shall not (except in case of rebellion or invasion) be suspended."
55. See DAVID HERBERT DONALD, LINCOLN 298-99 (1995).
56. Letter from Abraham Lincoln, President, United States, to Winfield
Scott, Commanding General, (Apr. 27, 1861), reprinted in ABRAHAM LINCOLN:




addressed a petition for habeas corpus to Roger Taney, who
was Chief Justice of the United States but who was sitting
as a circuit judge. Taney was a Marylander of the Southern
persuasion who hated Lincoln. Lincoln was not very fond of
Taney either. Taney had written the Dred Scott decision, 57
a disgustingly racist opinion finding among other things
that the Founders considered black people "so far inferior,
that they had no rights which the white man was bound to
respect."58 Dred Scott had been the centerpiece of many of
Lincoln's speeches that paved his way to the presidency. 59
In his first inaugural address, in fact, just before Taney
administered the oath of office to him, Lincoln gave advance
notice that he would not let Taney's Court stand in his way.
He said:
[T]he candid citizen must confess that if the policy of the
government, upon vital questions, affecting the whole people, is to
be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, the instant
they are made, in ordinary litigation between parties, in personal
actions, the people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having,
to that extent, practically resigned their government, into the
hands of that eminent tribunal.
60
For people like me-who think Abraham Lincoln wore a
halo, the country lawyer from Illinois who personified
devotion to the Rule of Law-that statement is something
of a head slap. And so was Lincoln's response to Taney's
decision in the Merryman case, 61 which was, essentially, to
ignore it.62
57. Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
58. Id. at 407.
59. See, e.g., Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Columbus, Ohio (Sept. 16, 1859),
reprinted in SPEECHES AND WRITINGS, supra note 56, at 49-54; Abraham Lincoln,
Address at Cooper Institute (Feb. 27, 1860), reprinted in SPEECHES AND
WRITINGS, supra note 56, at 111.
60. Abraham Lincoln, President, United States, First Inaugural Address,
(Mar. 4, 1861), reprinted in SPEECHES AND WRITINGS, supra note 52, at 221.
Lincoln had been persuaded by William H. Seward to tone this down from his
first draft, which said, "the people will have ceased to be their own rulers,
having turned their government over to the despotism of the few life-officers
composing the Court." DOUGLAS L. WILSON, LINCOLN'S SWORD: THE PRESIDENCY
AND THE POWER OF WORDS 63 (2006) (emphasis added).
61. Exparte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487).
62. Consider, by way of contrast, the penitential response of Andrew
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It must be said, in Lincoln's defense, that Taney was as
confrontational with his Merryman decision as a judge
could possibly be. Merryman was arrested on Saturday, his
petition was delivered to Taney on Sunday, and Taney first
demanded that a return be made on Monday. He relented
and gave General Cadwalader until Tuesday, but he had
already prepared his decision, and, when no return was
made on Tuesday, he read it from the bench. 63 He found
that the President did not have the power to suspend the
writ, or the power to authorize any military officer to do so,
and that military officers had no right to arrest anybody not
subject to the Articles of War for an offense against the
United States. Taney conceded in his opinion that he had
no power to enforce his own order. He said he had exercised
all the power the Constitution conferred upon him but that
"that power has been resisted by a force too strong for me to
overcome. '64 He directed the Clerk to transmit a copy of his
order under seal to the President and said "[i]t will then
remain for that high officer, in fulfillment of his
constitutional obligation to 'take care that the laws be
faithfully executed,' to determine what measures he will
take to cause the civil process of the United States to be
respected and enforced. '65 Then, at his own expense, he had
his decision printed as handbills and distributed them as
widely as he could.
Lincoln's answer was not to answer, except, in a July
Fourth message to a special session of Congress, to point
out that the Constitution was silent as to which branch of
the government had authority to suspend the writ and to
assert that, in an emergency, when Congress was not in
session, the President had the authority. 66 He went on to
Jackson to the contempt citation of a judge whom Jackson had arrested for
issuing a writ of habeas corpus at the end of the War of 1812. Cf. Caleb Crain,
Bad Precedent: Andrew Jackson's Assault on Habeas Corpus, THE NEW YORKER,
Jan. 29, 2007, at 78.
63. See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN
WARTIME 33 (1998); CARL B. SWISHER, THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE
844-48 (1974).
64. Exparte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 153.
65. Id.
66. Abraham Lincoln, President, United States, Special Message to




ask a famous rhetorical question, whether Taney meant
that "all the laws, but one" could go unexecuted, and "the
government itself go to pieces, lest that one be violated?"
67
A month later, Congress bailed Lincoln out of the serious
trouble he would otherwise be in among historians-legal
historians, anyway. On August 6, 1861, it enacted a statute
approving, legalizing, and validating all the acts,
proclamations, and orders that Lincoln had issued since his
inauguration, 68 and in March 1863 it enacted another
statute unambiguously authorizing the President to
suspend habeas "during the present rebellion."
69
The Merryman story is a necessary part of any history
of habeas corpus in America, but my purpose for retelling it
here is to emphasize the vulnerability of the writ when the
delicate constitutional system of checks and balances is
upset. There was no effective opposition to what Lincoln
did. His Republican party had complete control of both
houses of Congress, the Southern senators and
representatives having withdrawn. 70  Taney's Supreme
Court and all the federal courts were at the historic low
point of their influence after Dred Scott. Indeed, as one
scholar puts it, during the Civil War, "[p]etitioners applied
to the President and to military leaders rather than to the
courts. So great . . . was the scope of executive power, and
so limited the power of the courts, that by the end of the
war much of the deference ordinarily accorded to the
67. SPEECHES AND WRITINGS, supra note 56, at 253.
68. Act of Aug. 6 1861, ch. 63, § 3, 12 Stat. 326. "Scholars assert there is
uncertainty as to whether this August 6 Act included the suspension of habeas
corpus, although there seems to be no doubt that it included the declaration of
martial law." Anne English French, Trials in Times of War: Do the Bush
Military Commissions Sacrifice Our Freedoms?, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1225, 1232
n.31 (2002) (citing PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION
MAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS 225 (4th ed. 2000)); see also, David Currie, The
Civil War Congress, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 1131, 1140 (2003) (noting Maine Senator
William Pitt Fessenden's assurances that the Act 'avoids all questions with
regard to the habeas corpus and other matters, and refers' only to the 'military
appropriations' . . . ; 'there is nothing in the world in it except what relates to
the Army and Navy volunteers"' (quoting 37 CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong. 1st Sess.
442 (1861))).
69. Act of Mar. 3, 1863, 12 Stat. 755, 755.
70. Republicans held the Senate 32-16 and the House 106-70. DONALD,
supra note 55, at 304-05.
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judiciary was accorded elsewhere .... ",71 The President had
a clear field on which to act, and act he did, issuing further
proclamations suspending the privilege of the writ
throughout the country, "authorizing the arbitrary arrest of
any person 'guilty of any disloyal practice, affording aid and
comfort to Rebels against the authority of the United
States,' 72 and, in one case perhaps better remembered in
my town than yours, actually dissolving the District of
Columbia court that was the predecessor of my own court,
because its judges had defied Lincoln's military officers on a
habeas petition.73
IV. HABEAS BECOMES A POST-CONVICTION REMEDY
In 1867, a new Congress dominated by northern radical
Republicans rejected Andrew Johnson's permissive policies
toward the rebel states and passed Reconstruction Acts that
divided the South into military districts.7 4  This
Reconstruction legislation gave a great deal of new habeas
power to federal courts and judges-the power, "in addition
to the authority already conferred by law," to issue writs of
habeas corpus "in all cases where any person may be
restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the
[C]onstitution, or of any treaty or law of the United
States .... "75 A year later, in Ex parte McCardle, the
Supreme Court held that the 1867 Act "[brought] within the
habeas corpus jurisdiction of every court and of every judge
every possible case of privation of liberty contrary to the
National Constitution, treaties, or laws. It is impossible to
widen this jurisdiction."76 What federal judges now had was
the authority to reach into state and local jails. This, too,
was a power play: strong Congress, weak president,
71. SWISHER, supra note 63, at 901-02.
72. DONALD, supra note 55, at 380.
73. See MATTHEW F. McGUIRE, AN ANECDOTAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 1801-1976, at 44-46
(1977); JEFFREY BRANDON MORRIS, CALMLY TO POISE THE SCALES OF JUSTICE; A
HISTORY OF THE COURTS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT 36-37 (2001).
74. See John Harrison, The Lawfulness of the Reconstruction Amendments,
68 U. CHI. L. REV. 375, 405-08 (2001).
75. Habeas Corpus Act of 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385, 385.
76. Exparte McCardle, 73 U.S. 318, 325-26 (1868).
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defeated and compliant state governments in the rebel
South.
It took the courts another fifty years, until about 1920,
to begin exercising these broader powers, but, beginning
around 1920, habeas began its transition into what it
mostly is today-a legal tool for bringing post-conviction,
collateral challenges in criminal cases. By 1945, except for
the great World War II cases-Quirin,77 Yamashita,78
Eisentrager,79 Endo8 0-habeas had become a vehicle for
challenging convictions "on facts dehors the record"8 1 : "mob
domination of trial[s]," "knowing use of perjured testimony
by [the] prosecution," "[absence of] intelligent waiver[s] of
counsel[ ]," "coerced plea[s] of guilty," "[absence of]
intelligent waiver[s] of jury trial," and "denial[s] of right to
consult with counsel. '8 2
After World War II, habeas continued to develop along
those lines, and its development is hard to explain in terms
of checks and balances. Certainly there were disturbances
in the power grid during that period-Truman's seizure of
the steel mills, the Warren Court's orders to desegregate
public schools, Johnson's war in Vietnam, Nixon's legal
problems and Clinton's impeachment-but these
disturbances created little demand for a check against
unlawful or unexplained executive detention. For fifty
years, habeas was largely the province of the judiciary,
which, left to its own devices, both expanded its reach into
state judicial proceedings and managed, as judges will, to
create a frustrating procedural maze for petitioners. In
recent times, instead of providing a judicial check against
arbitrary and unlawful executive detention, habeas has
devolved into a federal judicial check against state judicial
proceedings.
By 1947, the number of habeas filings had expanded to
the point where the Judicial Conference of the United
States-think of it as the judiciary's College of Cardinals-
77. Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
78. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
79. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
80. Exparte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
81. United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 212 (1951) (emphasis omitted).
82. Id. at 212 n.12 (citations omitted).
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recommended statutory changes designed to streamline
procedures and reduce frivolous or repetitive prisoner
filings.83 One such change, a new provision on finality, now
codified as 28 U.S.C. § 2244, would "exclude applications
presenting no new grounds,"8 4 and allow judges to refuse to
entertain repetitive or "nuisance" habeas applications.
Another was a new way for federal prisoners to bring post-
trial challenges to their sentences, or to the constitutional
or jurisdictional bases of their convictions. This procedure,
now 28 U.S.C. § 2255, was a kind of quasi-habeas. A motion
under § 2255 would be filed, not where the prisoner's
custodian was, as habeas petitions had to be, but in the
court that had imposed the sentence. There was no
automatic requirement for the government to make a
return, and no requirement that the prisoner be produced.
A § 2255 motion could be, in practice almost always was,
and still is, handled entirely on paper.
Apparently nobody told the Supreme Court about this
effort to shrink the habeas caseload. Brown v. Allen,
8 5
decided in 1953, just before Earl Warren's arrival as Chief
Justice, removed any lingering doubt that the federal courts
were empowered to test the constitutionality of state court
convictions. That decision was followed by landmark
decisions of the Warren Court that dramatically expanded
the scope of constitutional protections for criminal
defendants,8 6 and the flood gates of prisoner habeas
litigation opened wide. Between the early 1950s and the
late 1980s, when the "abuse" question came to a head
again, the number of habeas petitions filed in federal courts
grew geometrically, if not logarithmically, from fewer than
1,000 per year to more than 20,000.87
83. See REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF SENIOR CIRCUIT JUDGES OF
THE UNITED STATES (1947).
84. George F. Longsdorf, The Federal Habeas Corpus Acts Original and
Amended, 13 F.R.D. 407, 418 (1953).
85. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
86. See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 284 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Washington v. Texas,
388 U.S. 14 (1967); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967); Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
87. Compare United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 212 n.13 ("By 1943,
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In 1995, in order to "curb the abuse of the habeas
corpus process, and particularly to address the problem of
delay and repetitive litigation in capital cases," 88 Congress
enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA).89 The federal courts, obsessing, as judges will do,
about caseloads and statistics,90 essentially asked for the
AEDPA, after receiving another report from the Judicial
Conference, this one chaired by Justice Louis Powell. 91 The
AEDPA imposed a one-year period of limitation for motions
filed under § 2255,92 and it precluded habeas relief for any
claim that had been adjudicated on the merits in state court
unless the state court result was contrary to "clearly
established federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court. ' 93 In other words, lower federal courts were to be
seen and not heard; we certainly were not to get all creative
with the Constitution.94 Since the AEDPA, writes Professor
1944 and 1945 ... the annual average of filings reached 845.... .") with ADMIN.
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS,
at table C-2 (2004) (23,344 federal habeas petitions filed), and ADMIN. OFFICE OF
THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, at table C-2
(2005) (24,633 federal habeas petitions filed).
88. H.R. REP. No. 23, at 8 (1995).
89. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
90. Nobody has written more, or more perceptively, about the development
of the judiciary into a cadre of managers, more than adjudicators, than
Professor Judith Resnik of Yale. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96
HARv. L. REV. 374 (1982); Judith Resnik, Whither and Whether Adjudication? 86
B.U. L. REV. 1101 (2006).
91. See H.R. REP. No. 23, at 8; JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES,
AD HOC COMMITTEE ON FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS IN CAPITAL CASES (Lewis F.
Powell, Jr., Chairman 1989). Justice Powell was not chosen at random to chair
this committee. In his concurring opinion in Schneckcloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218, 259 (1973) (joined by then-Associate Justice Rehnquist), he had
spoken of the "unprecedented extension of habeas corpus far beyond its historic
bounds and in disregard of the writ's central purpose .... ." The early
development of what eventually became the AEDPA, and the role of judicial
thinking in that development, are authoritatively spelled out in an article in
this Review, by the University at Buffalo Law School's present dean, R. Nils
Olsen, Jr., Judicial Proposals to Limit the Jurisdictional Scope of Federal Post-
Conviction Habeas Corpus Consideration of the Claims of State Prisoners, 31
BUFF. L. REV. 301 (1982).
92. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(1)-(4) (2000).
93. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000).
94. In Carey v. Musladin, 127 S. Ct. 649, 654 (2006), the Supreme Court
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Shoenberger in a recent Catholic University Law Review
article, "the ambit of the writ has been greatly limited-
some would say to the virtual vanishing point."
95
V. Quo VADIS?
So here we are, in 2007. We have no jurisdiction of
habeas petitions by alien combatants or suspected ones. We
have no power to hear post-conviction claims more than a
year old. We are instructed not to be creative. Where are
you going, habeas corpus? (That, by the way, is the meaning
of "quo vadis.") The answer, in my view, is nowhere-unless
attention is paid to several problems.
One problem, not widely known or understood, perhaps,
because habeas is now almost exclusively about collateral
review of criminal convictions, and because prisoners have
no political constituency, is delay. It takes far too long to
move a habeas petition, or a § 2255 application, through the
system. The habeas statute continues to pay lip service to
the three-day return period imported directly from the 1679
English statute, but in practice habeas and § 2255 petitions
linger for months, or even years. Each district judge is
required to report semiannually his or her "old motions" in
civil cases-those that have been pending undecided for
longer than six months.96 It's a negative incentive-a
shaming device-and it has been quite effective in getting
judges to move their cases along. Habeas corpus cases and
§ 2255 applications, however, are not regarded as
"motions." They are not reportable, so, if they are sitting on
remote corners of our desks gathering dust, there is no
public accountability. Transparency does wonders.
Another problem that needs to be addressed is the
procedural obstacles that confront prisoners seeking review
on the merits of their petitions. I have done no empirical
reinforced this directive, stressing that federal courts considering habeas
petitions may declare trial court proceedings unconstitutional only if the
proceedings under review ignored explicit direction from prior Supreme Court
opinions concerning clearly established federal law. After the AEDPA, a finding
that trial court proceedings were "so inherently prejudicial that they deprive[d]
the defendant of a fair trial," absent Supreme Court precedent directly on point,
is not enough. Musladin, 127 S. Ct. at 651.
95. Shoenberger, supra note 20, at 56.
96. See Civil Justice Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. § 476(a)(1) (2000).
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research on this subject, but I can tell you that virtually
every habeas petition and § 2255 application on my docket
has to be dismissed, or transferred to another court, before I
ever get close to the merits: the application was filed too
late, or it is a second or successive application, or it was
filed in the wrong court, or it seeks application of a
Supreme Court decision that has no retroactive
application. 97 I think my experience is common among
district judges. Most post-conviction claims do lack merit,
it's true, but I suspect that we expend a lot more energy
crafting careful opinions explaining why we cannot reach
the merits than we would if we simply ruled on the issues
that petitioners ask us to decide. 98
The third problem, of course, is the jurisdiction-
stripping provision of the Military Commissions Act of
2006. 99 I cannot comment outside my own courtroom on the
constitutional validity of what Congress did last year. What
I can and do say is that, when it silences the judiciary,
Congress abdicates its own historic role in the system of
checks and balances, and it leaves the way open to abuse of
the executive's power to detain. When the House of
Representatives refused to suspend the writ for Thomas
Jefferson, it left John Marshall free to act. When Congress
gave Lincoln carte blanche during the Civil War, there was
no space for the courts to act. It takes all three branches to
get it right; one cannot sit on the sidelines.
There is no legislative history that explains what
Congress did. One Congressman, formerly chair of the
House Judiciary Committee, pointed to a lawyer who talked
about making trouble for the government, 100 and it may be
97. At common law, the refusal of one court to discharge a prisoner was no
bar to the filing of second and successive applications to others courts, and
indeed an important part of the history of the writ was its employment by
courts to exercise their own jurisdiction and fend off encroachments by other
courts. See DUKER, supra note 18, at 28-41.
98. For an exhaustive commentary on the ramifications of habeas corpus
procedure, see Judith Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 837 (1984).
99. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 7 (a), 120 Stat.
2600, 2635 (2006).
100. 152 CONG. REC. H7522, H7547 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2006) (statement of
Rep. Sensenbrenner). To demonstrate the alleged obstructionism of lawyers at
Guantinamo, the Congressman quoted Michael Ratner, of the Center for
Constitutional Rights, this way: "The litigation is brutal [for the United
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that Congress was stampeded into thinking that
unscrupulous lawyers and activist judges would just gum
things up at Guant~namo. If that is what Congress
thought, it had faulty intelligence.
The accumulated record demonstrates only
professionalism on the part of lawyers and moderation and
restraint from the bench. I canvassed my colleagues on
their handling of the Guantanamo detainee cases and
confirmed my understanding that no judge has ordered the
release of any petitioner, and no judge has ordered a change
in the conditions of confinement or the treatment of any
Guantinamo detainee. One judge did order, early on, that
the government permit access by attorneys to their detainee
clients, 101 but the government neither seriously resisted nor
appealed that order, and thereafter lawyers were routinely
permitted access. The government did resist giving counsel
access to the medical records of one detainee who had been
force-fed, but it acquiesced in the judge's remedial order. 102
My court agreed, for our own efficiencies and to make life
easier for government counsel, that a single judge would
deal with administrative matters, such as the appointment
of counsel and the treatment of classified documents. 0 3
Many of us did require the government to prepare and file
factual returns-but, of course, that's how habeas corpus
works, and we waited much longer for returns than the
twenty days the habeas statute allows.
I do not say that the involvement of lawyers and judges
made it easy for the government at Guantinamo, but
nothing about the justice system we boast about-not
habeas corpus, grand juries, public trials, the presumption
of innocence, the right to counsel, the confrontation clause,
the privilege against self-incrimination, unanimous
States] ... [y]ou can't run an interrogation ... with attorneys." Michael Ratner,
Letter to the Editor, WALL ST. J., Mar. 14, 2007, at A13 (quoting "an article by
Onnesha Roychoudhuri in a March 2005 piece for Mother Jones"). What Mr.
Ratner actually said was, "Every time an attorney goes down there, it makes it
much harder for the U.S. military to do what they are doing. You can't run an
interrogation and torture camp with attorneys." Id. (emphasis added).
101. See In re Guant~namo Bay Detainee Cases, 344 F. Supp. 2d 174
(D.D.C. 2004) (setting forth procedures for counsel access to detainees).
102. See Majid Abdulla AI-Joudi v. Bush, 406 F. Supp. 2d 13 (D.D.C. 2005).




verdicts-nothing about our system is designed to make it
easy or comfortable for the government to lock people up
indefinitely without charges.
The extraterritorial reach of habeas corpus presents a
difficult set of issues, to be sure. The great World War II
decisions established that the writ "acts upon" the
custodian, not the prisoner,104 but just who the custodian is,
and where the custodian may be sued, and what rights a
petitioner has if the custodian fails to return just cause for
detention, remain unclear. 105 Not only are these difficult
issues, but no answer fits every case. Nobody would grant a
writ of habeas corpus to a combatant on the battlefield, but
should the United States government not be required to
show cause why it detains a Canadian citizen somewhere in
Poland? Dealing with questions like that, case by case, is
quintessentially the role of judges, as Anthony Lewis wrote
in a recent column: "Judges are not always wise. But in our
system they are the ones we trust to weigh acutely
conflicting interests."'0 6 Judges cannot play that role if they
have no jurisdiction, however. Nor, as I hope I have shown
here, can Congress's own force vector be effective in our
tripartite system of government if the judiciary is rendered
impotent. It is worth remembering what Chief Justice
Marshall wrote, 200 years ago in the Bollman case, about
"positive law,"107 by which he meant, not judge-made,
common law, but law enacted by the legislature: statutory
law. Congress can indeed remove our jurisdiction, but
Congress can also establish it, and clarify it.
Congress may soon consider legislation that would
"restore" habeas to where it was before the enactment of the
Military Commissions Act.108 My suggestion-my wish-is
104. See, e.g., Exparte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 304-05 (1944).
105. Compare the majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions in Rumsfeld
v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
106. Anthony Lewis, Not all Sources are Equal, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2007, at
A21.
107. Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. 75, 125-37 (1807). See also the later
observation of Justice Miller in In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 78 (1989), that the
habeas authority of federal courts comes only from the habeas statute, or
"positive law."
108. See, e.g., Habeas Corpus Restoration Act of 2007, S. 185, 110th Cong.
(2007); Restoring the Constitution Act of 2007, S. 576, H.R. 1415, 110th Cong.
(2007).
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that Congress do more than that. We seem to be, right now,
at one of those moments in history when the vectors of
power are changing. At such moments, as I think I have
shown, the writ of habeas corpus has been vulnerable, or it
has been ascendant. Now is a time when Congress should
not only restore full habeas corpus jurisdiction to the federal
courts, but also revisit the history and the fundamental
purposes of the Great Writ, and repair it. In particular, I
suggest that Congress address and consider removing or
reducing the procedural barriers that so often frustrate
merits review of habeas and § 2255 petitions; insist on the
prompt, timely handling of habeas and § 2255 petitions,
perhaps by enacting public reporting requirements; and,
most importantly, proclaim that the federal writ of habeas
corpus shall run to any place in the world where people may
be detained or otherwise deprived of their freedom by
officers or agents of the American government-so that
American justice may be, and may be seen to be, present
wherever in the world America shows her flag, projects her
power and influence, and trumpets her values of liberty and
freedom.
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